## Decentralized Finance

## Decentralized Exchanges (DEX)

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## Financial Exchanges



## Financial Exchanges 101



## Trade Matching Models

## Exchange



Non-Custodial
Trade Settlement

## Order Book



## Two Order Book Models

( Fast matching

+ No fees for canceled orders
- No censorship resistance
- Exchange front running



## EtherDelta



## LOB DEX: Lessons Learned

- Advantages:
- No KYC/AML
- No fees paid to the exchange
- No impermanent loss (explained later in AMM)
- Disadvantages:
- Fees for deposit, withdraw, trade creation/cancel
- Slow execution
- Not fully decentralized (mediating server)


## Settlement Layer

## Exchange



## Why do we need DEX?



Alice is rich
(aka a "whale")

Alice wants to provide her money to traders to earn fees
..but has to trust someone to manage her money


Bob is nifty trader

Bob wants to buy the latest coins ..but struggles to find a trusted source to buy

## DEX System Architecture



## DEX trading volume



## Automated Market Maker

## Liquidity Pool

Idea: Let a smart contract do the market making.


## AMM - Automated Market Maker

Idea: Let a smart contract do the market making.

Properties:


- Instant liquidity, irrespective of the trade size
- Purchase of asset $X$ increases price of $X$ and decreases the price of $Y$
- Ratio of asset $X$ and $Y$ sets the price
- Known as Constant Product (CP) AMM


## AMM Example



## AMM Example



## Expected Slippage

The expected increase or decrease in price based on the trading volume and available liquidity.


Amount $x$ of asset $X$

## Unexpected Slippage $\rightarrow$ Worse Execution Price



## Unexpected Slippage $\rightarrow$ Better Execution Price



## Slippage Protection

Configures a slippage protection threshold to prevent unacceptable slippage


## Slippage Protection

A transaction fails when crossing the slippage limit.


## Slippage Protection

A transaction fails when crossing the slippage limit.


## Pros and Cons of an AMM

- (+) No Order Book maintenance
- But arbitrage required
- (+) Simple implementation for CP AMM
- Low gas costs
- (-) Danger of impermanent loss/coin de-peg
- Total loss of funds possible
- (-) High slippage for low liquidity markets
- Please do observe your slippage tolerance
- (-) Users vulnerable to sandwich attacks
- See security lecture


## Exchange <br> Transaction Propagation

## Exchange Transaction Propagation

Trader

P2P Network


## Exchange Transaction Propagation

## Trader <br> P2P Network



## Exchange Transaction Propagation

Trader
P2P Network
Elected Leader/Miner


## Exchange Transaction Propagation

## Trader

P2P Network


## Exchange Transaction Propagation

- Asynchronous Blockchain P2P Network
- Best effort propagation
- Transparency

Mempool

- High-Frequency Trading

Final Block


Tx fee : 1

- Inclusion based on a fee auction
- Price Gas Auction (PGA)
- On the public P2P network
- Sealed Bid Gas Auction (SGA)
- On centralized network relay services


## Pegged and Stablecoin AMM

## Pegged/Stablecoin Swap



USD derivatives


Pegged coins

- Three Stablecoin Types
- Reserve-based
- Collateral-based
- Algorithmic


## Pegged/Stablecoin Swap



## Pegged/Stablecoins

- Pegged/Stablecoin prices move in expectation together
- The exchange rate should ideally remain 1 to 1
- A default CP AMM is not optimized for such case
- Stablecoin AMM pros/cons:
- (+) Better prices for bigger volumes (i.e. more liquidity) $\longleftarrow$
- (-) Potentially higher gas costs
- (-) Danger of a de-peg of a stablecoin


## Pegged/Stablecoin Swap



- Significant liquidity differences among exchanges
- Here an example for a 100M USD swap from DAI to USDC


## Price Curve

## Stableswap (aka Curve Finance)



## Slippage Comparison

Stableswap (aka Curve Finance)


What happens if a coin de-pegs?

What happens if a coin gets blacklisted?

## AMM Whitepaper

- Check out the whitepapers of different projects
- These are not peer-reviewed academic works
- Be aware of possible missing items/nuances
- Projects do not always disclose the full details
- Curve:
- https://curve.fi/files/stableswap-paper.pdf
- https://curve.fi/files/crypto-pools-paper.pdf
- Uniswap:
- https://uniswap.org/whitepaper.pdf
- https://uniswap.org/whitepaper-v3.pdf

Arbitrage


BTC/USD
(3) 11


## Arbitrage

- Multiple Markets with
- the same assets $X$ and $Y$
- different prices for $X$ and $Y$

- Prices are synchronized by "arbitrageurs"
- Profit from the price difference
- Also referred to as "spread"
- Requires to perform at least one transaction


## Arbitrage on two markets



## Arbitrage (with Flash Loan)



## AMM Impermanent Loss

## Impermanent Loss Example

2. Price increase of ETH
$1 \mathrm{ETH}=400 \mathrm{DAI}$

$1 \mathrm{ETH}==100 \mathrm{DAI}$
3. Add liquidity

1 ETH, 100 DAI
== 200 USD
$==10 \%$ of pool
3. Withdraw liquidity
$10 \%==0.5 \mathrm{ETH}, 200 \mathrm{DAI}$
$==400$ USD


## Impermanent Loss

- Impermanent == not permanent
- Realized upon withdraw only!
- IL can result in total loss
- Trading fees may compensate
- Liquidity mining may compensate
- Similar to a de-peg of a Stablecoin
- Possible Solutions

- Challenging
- Change of the bonding curve


## Impermanent Loss Calculator

| - • - | . Impermanent Loss Calculator $\mathrm{x}+$ |  |  |  | c |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\leftarrow \rightarrow C$ | - dailydefi.org/tools/impermar | ent-loss-calculator/ | \# | © Incognito (2) | : |
| dailydefi.org |  |  | Twitter | About |  |
| Impermanent Loss Calculator |  |  |  |  |  |
| This calculator uses Uniswap's constant product formula to determine impermanent loss. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fees are not included within results. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Initial Prices |  |  |  |  |  |
| Token A - \$ 100 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Token B - \$100 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Future Prices |  |  |  |  |  |
| Token A - \$1000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Token B - \$ 100 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Results |  |  |  |  |  |
| Impermanent loss: 42.50\% |  |  |  |  |  |
| If $\$ 500$ of Token $A$ and $\$ 500$ of Token B were held |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Have 5.00 Token A and 5.00 Token B |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Value if held: \$5,500.00 |  |  |  |  |  |
| If $\$ 500$ of Token $A$ and $\$ 500$ of Token B were provided as liquidity |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Have 1.58 Token A and 15.81 Token B (in liquidity pool) |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Value if providing liquidity: \$3,162.28 |  |  |  |  |  |

## AMM Liquidity Mining

## Liquidity Mining == Incentive

- 2 Types of rewards in DeFi Pools
- Trading fees (e.g. 0.03\% in Curve)
- Liquidity Mining rewards
- Liquidity Mining
- An incentive to provide liquidity to a pool
- Proportional rewards in terms of liquidity
- Can be added/removed anytime
- Retrospective airdrops possible $\rightarrow$ address history is valuable


## Liquidity Mining

## Curve

|  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Pool | Base APY | Rewards APY | Volume V |
| tricrypto CRYPTO V2][?] USDT + wBTC + WETH | 3.73\% | +2.04\% $\rightarrow$ 5.11\% CRV | \$28.7m |
| $\int_{3}^{3 \text { pool USD }} \mathrm{DAI}+\mathrm{USDC}+\mathrm{USDT}$ | 0.63\% | +3.14\% $\boldsymbol{7}$. $84 \% \mathrm{CRV}$ | \$120.3m |
| (\$) SUSD USD DAI + USDC + USDT + sUSD | 0.57\% | $\begin{aligned} & +2.59 \% \rightarrow 6.48 \% \quad \mathrm{CRV} \\ & \mathbf{+ 1 . 7 8 \%} \mathrm{SNX} \end{aligned}$ | \$12.5m |
| B) ren BTC renBTC + wBTC | 0.41\% | +5.84\% $\rightarrow$ 14.59\% CRV | \$9.9m |
| ironbank USD cyDAI + cyUSDC + cyUSDT | 4.11\% | +4.68\% $\boldsymbol{+ 1 1 . 7 0 \% ~ C R V ~}$ | \$7.7m |
| (B) bbtc BTC BBTC + sbtcCrv | 0.36\% | +2.60\% $\boldsymbol{\rightarrow 6 . 5 1 \% ~ C R V ~}$ | \$6.9m |
| busdv2 USD BUSD + 3Crv | 0.89\% | +5.25\% $\rightarrow$ 13.13\% CRV | \$6.7m |
| (5) lusd USD $\begin{aligned} & \text { LUSD }+3 C r v\end{aligned}$ | 0.58\% | +4.90\% $\rightarrow$ 12.25\% CRV | \$5.6m |
| (B) sbtc Brc renBTC + wBTC + sBTC | 0.36\% | +4.67\% $\rightarrow 11.67 \% \mathrm{CRV}$ | \$5.1m |
| tbtc BTC tBTC + sbtcCrv | 0.81\% | +13.77\% $\boldsymbol{\rightarrow} \mathbf{3 4 . 4 2 \% ~ C R V}$ | \$4.6m |
| See All Pools |  |  |  |

Alpha Homora v2

| Farm Pools <br> (18 Pools) <br> ALL | YIELD FARMING © ${ }^{\text {( }}$ |  | Search |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | LIQUIDITY PROVIDING © |  |
| D $\downarrow$ Yield Farming $\begin{aligned} & \text { Uniswap DPI/ETH }\end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 33.26 \% \\ & \text { t2.89\% } \end{aligned}$ | Yield Farming <br> Trading Fee <br> Alpha APR <br> Borrow APY | $\begin{array}{r} 18.74 \% \\ 7.34 \% \\ 16.32 \% \\ -9.15 \% \end{array}$ | FARM |
| Yield Farming <br> Sushiswap SUSHI/ETH | $\begin{aligned} & 63.58 \% \\ & 27.87 \% \end{aligned}$ | Yield Farming <br> Trading Fee <br> Alpha APR <br> Borrow APY | $\begin{array}{r} 38.67 \% \\ 17.74 \% \\ 16.32 \% \\ -9.15 \% \end{array}$ | FARM |
| Yield Farming Sushiswap DPI/ETH | $\begin{aligned} & 35.51 \% \\ & 74.00 \% \end{aligned}$ | Yield Farming <br> Trading Fee <br> Alpha APR <br> Borrow APY | $\begin{array}{r} 24.62 \% \\ 3.71 \% \\ 16.32 \% \\ -9.15 \% \end{array}$ | FARM |
| Yield Farming <br> Sushiswap LINK/ETH | $\begin{aligned} & 58.90 \% \\ & 22.62 \% \end{aligned}$ | Yield Farming <br> Trading Fee <br> Alpha APR <br> Borrow APY | $\begin{array}{r} 34.06 \% \\ 16.26 \% \\ 19.52 \% \\ -10.94 \% \end{array}$ | FARM |

## DEX Aggregator

- Users may ask
- Where do I get the best price for a trade?
- Where is the deepest liquidity?
- Two types of aggregators

- Off-chain aggregator (1inch, paraswap)
- (+) Can spawn multiple chains, very flexible
- (-) Operator can front-run users
- On-chain aggregator (swapswap)
- (+) atomic routing \& arbitrage
- (-) unlikely to efficiently cover 4+ exchanges


## 1inch

- Aggregates many DEX
- Very verbose UI for users
- Routing
- Explains which route taken
- No arbitrage performed



## SwapSwap

- Aggregates 2 DEX
- Uniswap and Sushiswap
- No UI change for the user
- Routing \& Arbitrage
- Routes a swap if the smart contract deems routing profitable
- Performs arbitrage with flash loans if deemed profitable by the smart contract



## How to detect trading opportunities in DeFi?

## How to detect arbitrage/profitable opportunities?

- Bellman Ford Algorithm
- Negative cycle detection
- Works among multiple markets
- Used in traditional finance and DeFi
- Theorem Solver (SMT)
- Needs to encode the DeFi model
- Apply heuristics for path pruning


## DeFiPoser-ARB and DeFiPoser-SMT [S\&P'21]

- DeFiPoser-ARB
- builds a directed DeFi market graph
- identifies negative cycles
- Bellman Ford-Moore algorithm
- DeFiPoser-SMT
- state transition model
- prunes search space
- theorem prover


## DeFiPoser-ARB



## DeFiPoser-ARB



Profitable condition
$p_{1} \cdot p_{4}>1$

## DeFiPoser-ARB



Profitable condition
$p_{1} \cdot p_{2} . p_{3}>1$

## DeFiPoser-ARB


$-\log p_{2}$
$-\log p_{3}$


## DeFiPoser-ARB

$$
-\log p_{3}
$$



$$
\begin{aligned}
& \prod_{p}^{p>1}, \\
& \sum_{i}(-\log p p)<0
\end{aligned}
$$

| BellmanFord-Moore algorithm |
| :--- |
| $O\left(\left\|N^{2}\right\| \cdot\|E\|\right)$ |

## DeFiPoser-SMT



Formulate DeFi actions into symbolic models.


Apply heuristics to reduce search space. E.g., a path must not include any loops.

SMT Solver

Objective constraint final profit greater than target value

## Optimization

Apply a binary search to find the optimal value.

## DeFiPoser Evaluation



- 96 actions on Uniswap, Bancor, MakerDAO, total of 25 assets
- Block 9100000 (Dec-13-2019) to 10050000 (May-12-2020)
- Validation by concrete execution
- Weekly revenue estimate:
- DeFiPoser-ARB: 191.48 ETH (76,592 USD)
- DeFiPoser-SMT: 72.44 ETH (28,976 USD)


## Bellman Ford vs. SMT

|  | DeFiPoser-ARB | DeFiPoser-SMT |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Path generation | Bellman-Ford-Moore, Walk to the root; <br> No acyclic paths | Pruning with heuristics; Any paths <br> within the heuristics |
| Path selection | Combines multiple sub-paths | Selects the highest revenue path |
| Manual DeFi modeling | No | Required |
| Captures non-cyclic strategies | No | Yes (e.g., bZx) |
| Optimally chosen parameters | 81.31 ETH (32,524 USD) | Yes (subject to inaccuracy of binary |
| Maximum Revenue | $22.40 \mathrm{ETH}(8,960$ USD) |  |
| Total Revenue (over 150 days) | $4,103.22 \mathrm{ETH}(1,641,288$ USD) | $1,552.32 \mathrm{ETH}(620,928$ USD) |
| Lines of code (Python) | 300 | 2,300 |

